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Robert Z. Lawrence 
Few issues in international economics are more contentious than the allegedly 
closed nature of the Japanese market. In the early 1980s, the issue so vexed 
the European Community that it sought redress through the General Agree- 
ment on Terms of Trade (GATT). Similarly, over the years the United States 
has conducted an extensive set of bilateral negotiations to open the Japanese 
market for its firms and products ranging from beef to baseball bats. 
Generally, the U.S. focus has been on ensuring equal treatment for foreign 
firms and products through changes in rules and procedures. In 1985, for ex- 
ample,  negotiations focused on  Market-Opening, Sector-Specific (MOSS) 
talks in four sectors-telecommunications,  electronics, forest products, and 
medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. In medical equipment, for example, 
the major issues were related to improvements in administrative procedures 
for granting new product approvals and manufacturing licenses and for setting 
reimbursement prices under Japan’s national health insurance program (see 
U.S.  International Trade Commission  1986). Currently the United States is 
delving even deeper into the structure of the Japanese economy in the so- 
called Structural Impediments Initiative. 
Official U.S. policy has generally sought to avoid setting quantitative im- 
port targets for Japan.’ It continues to try to change the rules of the game so 
that foreigners can compete equally in Japan. But increasingly, there are calls 
for the United States to shift its demands from equal opportunity to affirmative 
action. Some argue that Japan will never play by Western rules. Indeed, given 
the outstanding performance of the Japanese economy, the outside world has 
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no right to demand that Japan change the practices that have served it so well. 
Instead of trying to change Japan, the outside world should simply negotiate 
quantitative import targets and allow the Japanese government, which best 
understands its economic system, to ensure these are attained. The new slogan 
is therefore “results rather than rules.” 
In a recent paper, for example, Rudiger Dornbusch (1990) advocated set- 
ting quotas for aggregate Japanese imports of  manufactured goods from the 
United States. Dornbusch believes the United States should demand that U.S. 
manufactured goods exports to Japan maintain an annual growth rate of  10 
percent for the next decade. Absent such a response, Dornbusch advocates the 
imposition of a tariff on Japanese exports to the United States. Others advo- 
cate a more detailed sectoral approach to setting import levels. A report issued 
by  the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN), a 
private-sector advisory group to U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills, has 
suggested that the United States should require that the Japanese set quantita- 
tive import targets for specific commodities. 
These new proposals are being advanced because it is felt that past U.S. 
policies simply have not worked. The Japanese economy is closed to foreign 
products and firms and fails to respond to market incentives as do other coun- 
tries.  Advocates of  a results-oriented approach to Japanese trade generally 
agree that a managed trade system is not ideal. They also generally agree that 
the United States in particular is not well equipped to deal with a system that 
requires the detailed management of the international economy. But they sug- 
gest it is an appropriate second-best approach given the lack of effective alter- 
natives. 
But before policy shifts to such an approach, several questions need to be 
answered.  What precisely is  an “open” market? Are managed-trade policy 
approaches likely to achieve it? Is the Japanese market closed? Is it closed and 
unresponsive to price changes and negotiations over rules? In this paper I will 
try to answer these questions. 
One important distinction is between markets that are open to products and 
markets that are open to firms. In a world in which multinational corporations 
dominate trade, it is clearly inappropriate to think only of national production 
by  national firms. Particularly when embarking on a policy that manages re- 
sults, it is important to be clear on precisely what kinds of results are being 
sought. 
Many of the intangible barriers in the Japanese market may inhibit the sale 
of products made  by foreign jirms, but  they need  not preclude the sale of 
products manufactured by  foreign subsidiaries of  domestic firms. Ford and 
General Motors may not know how to make and sell an automobile that Japa- 
nese consumers will buy,  but Toyota and Honda surely do.  Japanese firms 
already have an established reputation with their Japanese customers. They 
understand how to deal with unusual aspects of Japanese institutions and cus- 
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Policy initiatives that stress achieving a Japanese market that allows a given 
quantity of imports equate openness with increased imports. But higher Japa- 
nese import volumes need not entail increased participation by foreign firms 
in the Japanese economy. Dornbusch, for example, emphasizes that what is 
important, from a U.S. perspective, is “good jobs and good wages” (1990, p. 
125). He argues that it is irrelevant whether the employer producing the ex- 
ports for the Japanese market is American or Japanese. 
But, from some perspectives, it is surely not irrelevant. An  increased de- 
mand by Japan for imports raises the demand for foreign labor. However, if 
the bulk of the imports are brought in by Japanese firms, the official and pri- 
vate practices that limit the degree to which newcomers can contest the Japa- 
nese market could continue. While the Japanese market might have more im- 
ported products, these could still be priced to maximize the profits of Japanese 
firms with monopoly power. Japanese consumers would not necessarily enjoy 
the full benefits of access to cheaper imported products. 
While a results-oriented approach might raise the volume of Japanese trade, 
it could actually lead to a market with more rather than less government and 
corporate control. In fact, such an approach gives up on the idea that the Jap- 
anese economy will ever be genuinely open. It settles for making sure that at 
least Japan buys a certain amount of imports as a quid pro quo for its exports. 
By insisting Japan implement such a system, the United States would severely 
limit Japan’s ability to become a genuinely liberal economy. Sector-by-sector 
targets can only be enforced if the MITI (Ministry of Trade and Industry) is 
powerful enough to guide Japanese firm behavior in great detail. The MITI 
would  be  forced to organize and  monitor numerous buying cartels.  Firms 
would be forced to collude on how imported products are to be handled. In- 
stead of  encouraging Japan in the liberal direction urged in its own official 
Maekawa report,  the policies would be  driving it back toward precisely the 
system the world finds so difficult in the first place.* Japanese firms would 
enhance their profits by  buying cheaper foreign inputs and producing some 
products abroad, but they could continue to exercise their power over domes- 
tic pricing and marketing practices. 
Between 1985 and the first quarter of  1989, according to the Japanese Eco- 
nomic Planning Agency (Government of  Japan 1989), the volume of manu- 
factured goods imports by Japan has doubled. In the light of this discussion, 
it might be important to examine the corporate identity of  these imports: Is 
Japan being opened by Japanese or foreign-owned firms? That is a question I 
will try to answer below. 
On the other hand,  barriers at the border against products made in other 
2. The discussion presumes such a policy could actually be  achieved. But  in  many sectors, 
given the nature of the barriers, it would be virtually impossible for the Japanese government in 
good faith to enforce such an agreement. In consumer goods or goods sold in markets with many 
firms the proposal is impractical. You can put goods on the shelves but  you cannot make people 
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countries do not necessarily hinder products made by  foreign firms in Japan. 
It is sometimes assumed that there is a positive relationship between imports 
and the establishment of  foreign firms in Japan. But of  course, there is no 
necessary linkage. If foreign-owned firms gain entry in Japan, particularly if 
import barriers remain, they may decide to produce more locally. Thus im- 
ports may actually decline rather than increase. A more “open” Japanese mar- 
ket for foreign firms need not lower the Japanese trade surplus or provide the 
benefits for foreign workers, foreign terms of trade, and spillovers in foreign 
economies that many seem to expect. 
While increased access of  foreign firms may bring some benefits to Japa- 
nese consumers, these could be limited given the structure of the market. Re- 
cently, the Japanese Fair Trade commission (FTC) contended that a joint ven- 
ture of  Apple (USA) and Canon unfairly maintains higher prices of  Apple 
computers in  the Japanese market by  various restrictive trade practices. As 
this example reminds us, once established in Japan, foreign firms may find it 
in their interest to bolster rather than remove entry barriers. 
The U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement is an example of a results- 
oriented trade policy in which the results that have been negotiated for and the 
results claimed by  advocates of the approach do not necessarily correspond. 
Laura Tyson  (1990), an advocate of  managed trade in  high-tech  industries 
defends this agreement. She argues that without such managed trade agree- 
ments the structure of the U.S. economy will deteriorate. 
She argues that in some industries knowledge does not flow easily across 
national borders. Such knowledge accumulates in firms in the form of skilled 
workers,  proprietary  technology,  and  difficult-to-copy  know-how  (Tyson 
1990, p. 160). “The goal of intervention, therefore, is not simply to improve 
the trade balance or to address external barriers abroad, but to secure a share 
of  world production and employment in such industries with the local knowl- 
edge, skills and spillover benefits which they generate” (Tyson 1990, pp. 167- 
68). That may  be the goal of  some advocates of  managed trade. But it is 
striking that the sideletter to the Semiconductor Trade Agreement (STA) ne- 
gotiated  between  the  United  States  and  Japan  called  for the  products of 
foreign-owned companies to achieve 20 percent of the domestic sales by  199  1. 
The semiconductors Texas Instruments produces in Japan or Korea, with Jap- 
anese or Korean labor and spillovers, qualify for this quota, but the semicon- 
ductors NEC or Fujitsu produce in the United States with U.S. labor and spill- 
overs do not.  As  it  has  been  implemented,  this initiative is certainly not 
framed in terms of its direct impact on the U.S. structure of production. 
A second major recent U.S. initiative also emphasizes corporate participa- 
tion rather than the U.S.  trade deficit or production structure. Robert Reich 
(1989) has noted that the major U.S. initiative to open the Tokyo market for 
cellular telephone sales by Motorola will increase the sales of telephones de- 
signed and manufactured in  Malaysia. Of  course, policies may legitimately 
reflect a variety of objectives. But, particularly when results are being man- 13  How Open Is Japan? 
aged, clearly the devil lies in the details. Unless there is a clear rationale for 
the policy, the specifics could make the results disappointing. For some pur- 
poses, for example, enhancing the welfare of U.S.  workers, it may suffice to 
emphasize greater import volumes; for other purposes, for example, enhanc- 
ing the profits of U.S. firms, it may suffice to seek increased participation by 
U.S. firms in Japan. But these approaches should not be confused with poli- 
cies that aim at maximizing global welfare by achieving a market that is open 
in the most fundamental sense, that is, a market that can be readily contested 
by  new  firms, both foreign and domestic, who choose to supply products 
made at home and abroad. 
Finally, it should be stressed that although they are often justified in terms 
of their impact on the aggregate trade balance, there is no necessary relation- 
ship between the size of  a nation’s trade balance and the openness of its mar- 
kets. West Germany, for example, has one of the world’s most open markets, 
but it often has a trade surplus that is a higher share of its GNP than Japan’s. 
In general, a nation’s trade balance in goods and services is a macroeconomic 
relationship that reflects in aggregate saving and investment behavior. While 
there are some channels by which changes in trade barriers may alter saving 
and investment behavior, the linkages are subtle and unlikely to be robust. 
After surveying some of these arguments, Richard Clarida has recently con- 
cluded “the macroeconomic implications of  opening foreign markets with 
Super 301 are likely to be negligible” (1989, p. 28). 
In the rest of this paper, I turn to the evidence. In particular I will examine 
several facets of the question, “How open is Japan?” Given the importance of 
the distinctions made in this introductory section, I will, in the first section of 
this paper, examine the corporate role in Japanese trade using primarily 1986 
data. I will present evidence of the unusually strong role played by  the intra- 
firm shipments of Japanese companies in Japanese trade. Japanese trade is 
distinctive because foreign exports to Japan have, until  recently, generally 
been shipped by the foreign affiliates of Japanese firms. I will argue that this 
behavior results from unusual market imperfections in Japan that have induced 
Japanese firms to move upstream through international backward vertical in- 
tegration. I will also argue that these same imperfections led to the unusually 
low share of intraindustry Japanese trade or, more precisely, to the low share 
of imports and exports of different varieties of similar products. 
In the second section of this paper I consider price behavior in Japan. Sev- 
eral empirical studies have tried to answer the question, “Does Japan import 
too little?’ To  explore the issue they have been forced to overcome complex 
methodological obstacles that make it difficult to provide conclusive answers. 
Some studies have concluded Japanese import levels can be explained by  the 
fundamental attributes of the Japanese economy. Other studies have concluded 
they cannot. But it has been difficult to pin down precisely the role played by 
import barriers. I will argue, however, that too little attention has been fo- 
cused on the more important evidence of  barriers: the large and persistent 14  Robert Z. Lawrence 
price differences between Japan and other industrial economies.  1 will show 
that these differences persist at the manufacturing level when distribution mar- 
gins are removed.  There is also strong evidence that  imported  products  in 
Japan are subject to unusually high markups. It appears, therefore, that poten- 
tial arbitrage opportunities between Japan and the rest of  the world  are not 
fully exploited. 
The third section examines the adjustment of imports in Japan to the strong 
yen. It suggests that many of  barriers to the Japanese market operate like tar- 
iffs rather than quotas. They keep imported products expensive in Japan, but 
they  do not prevent  marginal  responses  to price  and cost incentives.  I will 
show that, at the margin, manufactured import flows into Japan are quite nor- 
mal in their responses to changes in relative costs. The result has been a dra- 
matic increase in the volume of  manufactured goods imports into Japan be- 
tween  1985 and  1989-an  increase  that  actually exceeds  what might have 
been  expected  on the  basis  of  historical  relationships  between  import  vol- 
umes, domestic activity, and the real exchange rate. While only preliminary 
data are available, it appears that intrafirm shipments by Japanese firms con- 
tinue  to account  for a substantial  imports  share. Nonetheless the data also 
show that the share is declining and the intrafirm shipments of U.S. firms is 
rising. There is also some evidence that the sectoral approach to opening the 
Japanese market has worked. In the light of this evidence the Japanese market 
does appear closed, but there is also considerable evidence it is responding to 
price changes and sectoral negotiations. 
1.1  Intrafirm Trade Patterns 
Much of the theory of international trade ignores the role of corporations in 
the conduct of trade. Trade is presumed to take place in arms-length transac- 
tions between buyers located in the importing country and sellers located in 
the exporting country. Yet, a remarkably high proportion of international trade 
occurs through intrafirm shipments. This institutional reality underscores the 
complementarity  that frequently exists between foreign trade and direct for- 
eign investment. There appear to be major benefits from international vertical 
integration. 
If  the markets for goods or factors were perfect, there would be no multi- 
national companies (MNCs). Market  transactions would  dominate intrafirm 
transactions.  But where imperfections do exist, they can be internalized when 
a firm engages in direct foreign investment (see Rugman  1980). As Hymer 
(1976) first pointed out, when the firm has a specific advantage developed in 
response to a market imperfection, it will benefit from exploiting its advantage 
in other national markets. These advantages include acquiring factor inputs at 
a lower cost than its rivals; better distribution  and marketing facilities; and 
monopoly advantage in information, research, knowledge, or some other as- 
pect of the production process. 15  How Open Is Japan? 
These explanations for direct foreign investment suggest that, if market im- 
perfections differ across countries, the degree and nature of international in- 
vestment could differ as well. Indeed the patterns of international investment 
could provide clues about differences in market imperfections. 
Japan  has  an  unusually  small amount  of  intra-industry  trade. Lawrence 
(1987) estimated, for example, that in  1980 an index of intra-industry trade 
for Japanese manufactured goods trade measured 30 compared with an aver- 
age of 70 in other major industrial countries.  But what is perhaps less well 
appreciated about Japanese trade, however,  is the large amount of intrafirm 
trade. Using Department of Commerce Surveys on the trade flows associated 
with  U.S. MNCs and those with the foreign affiliates located in the United 
States, we can put together the following picture: as reported in table  1.1, in 
1986 intrafirm trade accounted for 48.5 percent of U.S. exports to Europe and 
42.0 percent of U.S. imports from Europe. But intrafirm shipments accounted 
for 75.0 percent of U.S. imports from Japan and 72 percent of U.S. exports to 
Japan. 
A striking feature of these numbers is the unusual degree to which Jupunese 
MNCs dominate Japanese imports. In  U.S.  and  European  exports to each 
other, the exporting country firms dominate the intrafirm sales. In 1986, intra- 
firm shipments of U.S. exporters accounted for 36.9 percent of U.S. exports 
to Europe, while intrafirm shipments by European exporters account for 29.8 
percent of EC exports to the United States. Similarly, Japanese exports to the 
United States were dominated by the intrafirm shipments of Japanese export- 
ing firms-their  share was 66.1 percent of all U.S. imports from Japan. This 
suggests typically the international vertical  integration process moves down- 
stream internationally from producers to their markets. Usually firms that de- 
velop a differentiated product in their home market discover they can exploit 
that advantage by selling it abroad. 
The literature suggests several reasons why firms find it preferable to ex- 
ploit  their  advantage  by  an internal rather than  an arms-length  transaction. 
Explanations  for  international  integration  include  preserving  firm-specific 
knowledge  in  the  face of  appropriability  problems  or preserving  oligopoly 
power.  Explanations for downstream  vertical  integration more generally  in- 
clude the  advantages conferred in (i) providing  information  and knowledge 
to the seller about complex products; (ii) obtaining feedback from customers; 
(iii) overcoming the risks associated with investment by retailers and whole- 
salers in highly  specific assets;  and (iv) internalizing the externalities asso- 
ciated from quality debasement. (Independent distributors may not take ac- 
count of  the  full  adverse  impacts  of  improper  installation  and  service  on 
reputation). 
But the structure of Japanese imports is unusual because movements have 
typically  been  upstream.  Intrafirm  shipments  from  Japanese  subsidiaries 
abroad to their parent companies dominate Japanese imports. In 1986, Japa- 
nese affiliates in the United States shipped 58.4 percent of all U.S. exports to Table 1.1  Intrafirm 'lkade in 1986 (%) 
Europe  Japan 
Foreign  U.S. 
Affiliates  Affiliates  Of Which 
Foreign  U.S. 
Affiliates  Affiliates  Of Which 
toifrom  to/from  Majority-owned  tolfrom  to/from  Majority-owned 
Total  Foreign Parent  U.S. Parent  Affiliate  Total  Foreign Parent  U.S. Parent  Affiliate 
U.S. exports  48.5  11.6  36.9  32.8  72.0  58.4  13.6  9.7 
U.S. imports  42.0  29.8  12.2  10.5  75.0  66.1  8.9  1.8 
Source: Survey of Current Business (U.S. Department of Commerce 1989). 17  How Open Is Japan? 
Japan back to their Japanese parents. By contrast, U.S.  affiliates in Japan im- 
ported from their parent companies only 13.6 percent of all Japanese imports 
from the United States (see table 1.1). 
One potential explanation for this unusual corporate involvement could be 
an unusual commodity composition of  Japanese imports. The United States 
could export commodities in which direct shipments by  U.S.  firms typically 
play a relatively small role. But this does not explain the small direct U.S. 
company role. In their 1986 sales to other countries, U.S. companies shipped 
directly to their affiliates 27.6 percent of the manufactured goods exports that 
have the same mix as those imported by  Japan from the United States. By 
contrast, they shipped only 9.4 percent of  U.S. manufactured exports to Ja- 
pan. As reported in table 1.2, intrafirm shipments by  U.S. companies in their 
trade with Japan are an unusually small share of U.S. exports to Japan in every 
major export category. Similarly, the kinds of  imports Japan buys from the 
United  States are not  typically  imported by  parent firms in  the importing 
country. 
Firms with established positions in the Japanese market find it profitable to 
invest in production or purchasing entities abroad. Apparently the structure of 
the  Japanese economy provides unusually  strong  incentives for  upstream 
movement and results in Japan’s international trade being conducted by Jupu- 
nese distributors. 
These patterns of corporate involvement are actually complementary to the 
observation that Japan has an unusually small degree of intra-industry trade. 
Krugman and  others have  explained intru-industry trade as resulting from 
preferences for variety and economies of scale in production. Krugman (1983) 
has also shown that, where the fixed cost that yields scale economies is not in 
production research but in research and development (R&D), firms may prefer 
to carry out some of the production abroad. When intrafirm shipments of im- 
ports are dominated by foreign firms, as they generally are, they are likely to 
reflect the importation of new product varieties. But intrafirm imports by  do- 
Table 1.2  Percentage of Total U.S. Exports Shipped by U.S. Multinationals to 
Their Foreign Amiates, by Commodity, in 1986 
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mestic firms are more likely to reflect domestic market imperfections. They 
are likely to involve shipments of  inputs that are cheaper abroad or imports of 
varieties  produced  by  the  domestic  firm  that  can  be  manufactured more 
cheaply abroad. Domestic firms are less likely to import directly products that 
compete directly with those they (or their associates) manufacture at home. 
Intrafirm shipments by domestic firms are thus less likely to result in the im- 
portation of new varieties produced abroad. 
1.1.1  Trading Companies 
The majority of  intrafirm import shipments in Japan appear to be  under- 
taken by general trading companies. As indicated in table 1.3, the Japanese 
affiliates reporting extensive shipments of U.S. exports to Japan are concen- 
trated in, but not confined to, wholesale trade-particularly  in farm products 
and  metals and minerals.  While trading companies are not unknown else- 
where, in no other country have they grown to the extent and size that they 
have in Japan. It is difficult to obtain data on some of the large foreign com- 
panies that are not publicly held, but according to Young (19791, for example, 
in 1976 only three of the 12 large multiproduct trading companies that existed 
in other countries had sales above $1 billion, whereas each of  Japan’s big 10 
Table 1.3  U.S. Exports to All Countries Shipped by Japanese Affiliates in 1986 
and 1987 
1986  1987 
Exports in  Exports in 
Millions of  % of  Millions of  96  of 
$US.  Total Exports  $US.  Total Exports 
All industries 
Manufacturing 
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had sales between $5 billion and $33 billion. Total annual sales of the largest 
non-Japanese  trading  company  (Kooperativa Foroundel  of  Sweden)  were 
$2.95 billion-which  made it as large as the seventh largest Japanese com- 
pany. 
It is an error to view the trading companies only as purveyors of raw mate- 
rials imports. They play a major role both as exporters and importers of a wide 
variety of manufactured goods. They have acted as agents for imports of nu- 
clear plants from Westinghouse and General Electric and aircraft from Boeing 
and  Lockheed.  In  its  business profile,  the  Nissho Iwai Trading Company 
notes, for example, that it serves as “the exclusive agent for the Boeing Air- 
craft Company for sales to airlines, McDonnell Douglas for military aircraft 
to Japan’s self defense forces and DeHaviland for commuter aircraft” (Nissho 
Iwai Business Profile). 
It  is also an error to view  these companies simply as brokers or traders. 
They provide their customers with an extensive set of services, including in- 
formation  and  intelligence,  medium-term finance,  shipping,  warehousing, 
and distribution. Their international and domestic equity relationships extend 
backward into mining, agriculture, and manufacturing and forward to retailers 
and shopping centers. The trading companies are firmly rooted in the domes- 
tic distribution system, and they have complemented this position with exten- 
sive import distribution systems. These include huge complexes-kombina- 
zos-for  the unloading, warehousing, and distribution of  imported products 
such as food, chemicals, and steel products (for a description, see Kojima and 
Ozawa 1984). These centers allow the efficient allocation of imports to down- 
stream affiliates and independent customers. 
From a transactions cost perspective, these companies’ role in imports de- 
rives from some unique attributes of the Japanese economy, in particular, its 
distance both physically and culturally from the rest of the world. It is costly 
for Japanese buyers to purchase products directly from abroad. The trading 
companies are a conduit between Japan and the world, and they provide spe- 
cialized intermediation services that are obviously subject to economies of 
scale and scope. Firms buying imports can obtain these services more cheaply 
from specialized agents than they could obtain them for themselves. On the 
other hand,  as Yamamura (1976) has suggested, “because of  linguistic and 
cultural similarities and geographical proximity among the Western trading 
partners . . . the absolute costs of information, of negotiation, and of enforce- 
ment of contracts . . . were significantly lower than they were for Japan.” 
But government policies and other practices also account for the trading 
companies role. As Kojima and Ozawa (1984, p. 62) have written: 
Japan’s major trading companies enjoy monopsonistic positions in securing 
vital industrial resources and foodstuffs from overseas, partly as a result of 
the commercial tradition dating back to the Meiji period. The trading com- 
panies operate very closely-if  not exclusively-with  the member compa- 
nies of their respective industrial groups. These unique features of Japanese 20  Robert Z. Lawrence 
industry enable them to create “shoken” or the commercial right to inter- 
mediate in trade. Indeed trading companies monopolize the import and dis- 
tribution channels for iron ore, coking coal and other mineral resources, as 
well as grains-albeit  in a climate of fierce rivalry. 
In the nineteenth century, Japan was dependent on foreign merchant trading 
companies for the conduct of its trade (for historical accounts, see Kojima and 
Ozawa 1984; Yamamura 1976; and Young 1979). Partly because of conscious 
government policy, control was handed over to domestic trading companies. 
Indeed, the role of  the trading companies in Japanese trade appears to be a 
case in  which the Japanese comparative advantage was nurtured by  policy. 
Government policies actually granted the trading companies monopolies to 
trade or shoken in commodities such as iron ore and coking coal. 
Government nurturing of the trading companies was particularly important 
when imports and foreign exchange were tightly controlled. During the 1950s 
and 1960s when foreign exchange was rationed, the trading firms that gener- 
ated the largest amounts for export revenues were granted lucrative import 
quotas. According to Tsurumi (1980), “Import licences for such lucrative con- 
sumer goods as bananas, whiskey and crude sugar were given to the trading 
firms which had already met the export targets for ships, rolling-stock and 
machine tools. The export of  ships was particularly subsidized through this 
linking process. Lasting well into the 1950s, the linking policy naturally pre- 
cipitated  the  diversification of  goods  and  services  handled  by  one  firm” 
The trading companies served as key agents in the Japanese policy of  im- 
port substitution in the 1950s and 1960s. But government policies were rein- 
forced by the practices of industrial groups. In particular the connections that 
exist between the companies and the large keiretsu groups-themselves  de- 
scendents of  the zaibatsu. Today’s large trading companies such as Mitsui 
Busan and Mitsubishi Shoji expanded as commercial wings of their zaibatsu 
groups with secure sources of income derived from their rights to intermediate 
group transactions. 
Today, the connections between the companies and their groups are not ex- 
clusive. Trading companies do not limit their dealings to group firms and affil- 
iates, but group manufacturing firms do provide them with assured,  if  not 
captive, customers. Long-term relationships between buyers and sellers are of 
course pervasive in the Japanese economy. While these relationships do not 
always entail formal internalization in the form of  vertical integration, they 
frequently entail a complex set of  associations through  membership in the 
same industrial group, keiretsu, the exchange of equity, and the adoption of 
deliberate techniques that require a large measure of  mutual trust between 
buyers and sellers. The pervasiveness of these relationships suggest that, par- 
ticularly within Japan, these organizational relationships offer distinct trans- 
actional advantages. 
Many of  these practices may well be economically rational. Indeed, they 
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may be more effective than the arm’s length practices elsewhere-particularly 
in a society in which adversarial and litigious responses to contract breeches 
are deemed particularly costly. 
It is noteworthy, for example, that having learned about Japanese methods 
for relationships with suppliers by  observing and participating in joint ven- 
tures with Japanese automobile companies who have located assembly opera- 
tions in the United States, the big three U.S.  producers have changed their 
own supplier relationships. As Schnapp (1988, p. E-4) concluded in his re- 
view of the U.S. auto parts industry, “The U.S. components supply structure 
is evolving into one similar to the Japanese model . . . [which] will involve 
greatly intensified interdependence between automakers and  their first tier 
suppliers and between  those  first tier suppliers and  their own vendor  net- 
works.  . . .  For original equipment parts makers, it’s conform to the Japanese 
model or die.” 
But while they may enhance efficiency in some respects, these relationships 
also increase market power. As Perry has pointed out, vertical integration can 
be particularly useful for a monopsonist. Vertical integration permits a mon- 
opsonist to capture the rents that are enjoyed by  intramarginal sellers when 
the price is driven up by  p~rchases.~  It is an interesting confirmation of the 
Perry thesis that Japanese trading companies became more active in direct 
foreign investment when Japan became a significant purchaser of raw materi- 
als. Once their purchases had grown large enough to affect the prices they 
paid, it paid trading companies to internalize these purchases. But if  the sys- 
tem of bringing raw materials inputs into Japan had been competitive, firms 
in the Japanese distribution system would have been content to buy  inputs 
from a variety of international distributors. 
The major role played by Japanese firms abroad in exports to Japan is con- 
sistent with the evidence, adduced by  Kreinen, that Japanese purchasing be- 
havior in general differs from that of other countries, even where the purchases 
are  made  abroad.  In  particular,  Kreinin  (1988) finds  that  Japanese  firms 
abroad have an unusually strong preference to buy from Japanese rather than 
other foreign suppliers. 
In sum, the Japanese economy provides trading companies with major ad- 
vantages as procurers for Japan. They are extremely efficient providers of in- 
termediation services, which are required by  Japanese firms who engage in 
trade because of  the cultural and geographic distance of Japan from its mar- 
kets. In addition, however, their positions have been bolstered by  policy and 
other practices.  In particular, the companies have functioned as the buying 
and selling arms of  industrial groups. The existence of the large array of entry 
barriers to selling in Japan implies that companies who have already sunk the 
costs in overcoming them have an inherent advantage as buyers of  attractive 
foreign products. 
3. See the discussion of this case in Krugman (1983) 22  Robert Z. Lawrence 
1.1.2  Implications 
Given the importance of the trading companies in Japanese imports, a key 
issue is their willingness to import products that compete directly with domes- 
tic firms with whom they have close relationships. Gerlach (1989), for ex- 
ample, suggests they do not do this freely. “Whatever price reductions might 
be passed along to the Japanese buyer of foreign products are at least partially 
‘absorbed’ by the vertical channels through which these products must flow. 
Japanese firms are as interested in protecting their relationship with domestic 
suppliers as they are in passing along cost savings to others.” 
On the other hand, the trading companies do appear willing, indeed eager, 
to encourage imports in cases where these are in  the interests of  domestic 
manufacturing firms. They have not only played a crucial role in providing 
raw materials for the economy but, according to Kojima and Ozawa (1984), 
“they have also been instrumental in persuading firms to locate abroad to serve 
the Japanese market when it appears production is no longer competitive. Ko- 
jima and Ozawa describe how the trading companies responded to the decline 
in Japanese competitiveness in labor-intensive low-skill products in the early 
1960s by encouraging Japanese manufacturers to establish overseas manufac- 
turing ventures. Typically they organized ventures with consortiums of com- 
panies within their affiliated keiretsu (Kojima and Ozawa 1984, p. 83). 
As Japanese manufacturing  firms increase their direct foreign investment 
abroad, they will become less reliant on the trading companies for their sup- 
plies of foreign inputs. But if the trading companies’ role in trade diminishes, 
an alternative source of intra-Japanese-firm shipments of Japanese imports is 
likely to increase. 
1.1.3  Foreign Affiliates in Japan 
While the intrafirm shipments to Japanese parents from their overseas affil- 
iates are an unusually high  share of  Japanese imports, the shipments from 
foreign parents to Japanese affiliates are an unusually small share of foreign 
exports to Japan. In 1986, U.S.  companies shipped  13.6 percent of all U.S. 
exports to Japan to their Japanese affiliates and just 9.7 percent of these ex- 
ports to majority-owned affiliates. In manufactured goods the U.S. company 
role is even smaller. In  1986, U.S.  firms shipped just $947 million to their 
majority-owned manufacturing affiliates in Japan (and $1.6 billion to all affil- 
iates). Japanese  intrafirm trade in U.S. manufactured exports to Japan is as 
important as U.S. intrafirm trade. 
Kenichi Ohmae (as quoted in  Bergsten  and Cline  1985, pp.  107-8)  has 
made much of the large sales by U.S. owned and affiliated companies in Ja- 
pan, but in fact these sales are extremely small for a country with an economy 
the size of Japan. In  1987, for example, sales by nonbank affiliates of  U.S. 
companies in Japan were $1 14.7 billion, of  which $23.3 billion were by pe- 
troleum companies and $70 billion by manufacturing companies. However, a 
sizable share of  the manufacturing sales is by  companies,  such as Mazda, 
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nority  holdings  but  are  not  generally  regarded  as  American.  Sales  by 
majority-owned  U.S. affiliates were $42.416 billion of which just $17.6 bil- 
lion were by manufacturing companies. This is not much larger than the $14.6 
billion  sales  recorded  by  U.S. majority-owned  manufacturing  affiliates  in 
Australia,  New  Zealand, and South Africa.  By contrast, sales by  majority- 
owned U.S. affiliates in European manufacturing were $228.8 billion. 
The total value of owners’ equity in U.S. majority-owned affiliates in Japan 
amounted to $1 1.5 billion in 1987, of which just $6.4 billion was in manufac- 
turing. Thus while there are U.S. companies that have successfully penetrated 
the Japanese market, they remain the exception rather than the rule. Despite 
the lifting of formal restrictions on inward direct foreign investment, foreign 
entry into Japan remains low compared with investment in other major indus- 
trial nations. 
The result, therefore, is that U.S. exporters to Japan remain highly depen- 
dent on Japanese distributors for the sale of their products in Japan. This sug- 
gests that the argument that the Japanese market is closed to imports needs to 
be modified. If foreign goods are directly competitive with domestic products 
they will have difficulty entering. If imports are complementary with the inter- 
ests of domestic companies they will not. However, in most cases, corporate 
control over the trade rests in Japanese hands. 
The role of Japanese companies in Japanese trade also has significant polit- 
ical  implications.  It is striking, for example, that while Japanese and  West 
German manufactured  goods exports are of  similar magnitudes,  Japan  en- 
counters obstacles to its exports regularly, while Germany rarely does. Part of 
the  explanation  may  lie  in  the  speed  with  which  Japanese  exports have 
grown-they  represent a new entrant whose presence is disruptive to existing 
relationships.  But I have argued elsewhere (Lawrence 1987) that another rea- 
son is Japan’s low share of intra-industry trade. The high level of West Ger- 
man exports of a wide variety  of products means that when domestic firms 
complain  about German export competition, there  are other domestic  firms 
that have an important stake in the German market and will tend to counteract 
them.  But  since Japanese imports are  low,  there  are rarely  such offsetting 
forces when there are complaints about Japanese exports. The evidence in this 
section reinforces this explanation: not only are Japanese imports of manufac- 
tured  goods low, but U.S. firms play an unusually  small role in selling the 
American products Japan does import. Since U.S. firms are generally more 
politically influential than foreign  subsidiaries,  Japanese influence  in offset- 
ting  protectionist  actions is  even  weaker  than  the  low  level  of  its  imports 
would suggest. 
1.2  Prices 
In 1985, according to the OECD, imports accounted for 5.8  percent of Jap- 
anese expenditures on manufactured  products.  By contrast,  they  were  12.9 
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imports are low, the explanation for this level remains controversial. There is 
an extensive set of  anecdotes on Japanese import barriers in specific sectors. 
But  economists  mistrust anecdotal evidence because it may  be  selectively 
biased (only the losers complain) and not subject to quantitative appraisals. 
They have, therefore, sought firmer evidence that barriers have had a signifi- 
cant impact on Japan’s trade structure. 
The problem is that factors other than trade barriers could, in principle, 
account for Japan’s trade structure. Thus some basis is required for determin- 
ing what import level would be expected if no barriers existed (or if Japanese 
barriers were no different from those in other countries). While Japan may 
well have unusually extensive barriers to manufactured goods imports, its low 
level of imports is undoubtedly also influenced by its distance from its trading 
partners (physically and culturally) and its relatively poor endowments of nat- 
ural resources. 
Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate the quantity of Japanese manu- 
factured goods imports are unusually low. Krugman (1987), for example, sug- 
gests Japan might be expected to have an import share of manufactured goods 
at least as large as the extra-EC imports of the European Community. While it 
has fewer natural resource endowments, which would lead to lower manufac- 
tured goods imports, Japan is smaller than Europe, which should lead it to 
import more. In fact, in 1984, Japanese-manufactured imports of 2.9 percent 
were less half the 6.5 percent share of GNP accounted for by extra-EC manu- 
factured goods imports. Similarly Krugman has compared German and Japa- 
nese imports of  U.S.  manufactured goods exports to reach a similar conclu- 
sion.  Srinivasan and Hamada apply parameters to some analytic models of 
trade under imperfect competition and conclude that the total Japanese import 
penetration ratio would be expected to be between 30 and 60 percent higher 
than that in the United States, while the expected import penetration ratio in 
manufacturing would be 24 percent higher than in the United States. 
More extensive  studies of  Japan’s trade structure have reached  different 
conclusions.  Saxonhouse (1988) (with the exception of  several agricultural 
sectors), Learner (1987), Bergsten and Cline (1985), Noland (1987), and Bal- 
assa and Noland (1988) have run tests that conclude that Japanese import lev- 
els are “normal” given the other attributes of  its economy. Lawrence (1987) 
and Balassa and Noland (1988), on the other hand, find evidence that Japa- 
nese-manufactured  imports are unusually low. 
Srinivasan and Hamada (1989) have appraised these studies and (with the 
exception of  Learner) found methodological weaknesses in all of them. The 
empirical tests of  the models do not appear to  be precise specifications of 
the theories on which they are based.  Saxonhouse is criticized for using a 
theory that requires assuming the same number of  products as factors, using 
the inappropriate forecast interval for his test, and running a test in which the 
coefficients may also be subject to simultaneity bias (because protection may 
systematically affect factor prices).  In fact,  as Saxonhouse has pointed out 25  How Open Is Japan? 
(although not noted by Srinivasan and Hamada) Learner’s tests are subject to 
the same simultaneity pr~blem.~  My own work (Lawrence 1987) is criticized 
for misspecification of  my  estimation equation due to the use of  an additive 
distance variable, independent variables that are not exogenous, and express- 
ing the variables in logarithms rather than levels. Balassa and Noland (1988) 
fall short for not using a model that is clearly derived from theory. 
It appears, therefore, that these empirical tests do not settle the issue. The 
problem with all these tests is that they do not explicitly test for the presence 
of  trade barriers. They are tests for determining if  Japanese imports are un- 
usually low.  But even if Japanese imports are unusually low, other facts that 
do not appear in the model, such as unusual preferences or technology, rather 
than trade barriers, might be the reason. To provide a flawless test, it appears 
the barriers must be explicitly modeled. But this is rather difficult when, by 
their very nature, they are “intangible” or even invisible. 
1.2.1  Prices 
But perhaps all the tests discussed above are not asking the most relevant 
question. They focus too much attention on the question of quantities or trade 
structure and not enough on the question of  prices.  Perhaps the important 
question is not “Does Japan import too little?’ but “Are imports too expensive 
in Japan?’ Before we descend into the knotty issues of national differences in 
taste and factor endowments, it seems necessary to clear up the earlier ques- 
tion of  whether consumers in Japan are given the same choices. The direct 
observation of  price behavior may be a more accurate measure of openness 
than tests of quantities that test on elaborate statistical models. 
Actual trade flows may be low for fundamental economic reasons such as 
factor endowments and the competitiveness of  Japanese products, but if  the 
Japanese market is contestable, we should see the potential for entry keeping 
Japanese prices in line with those in other markets. If the same product sells 
for different prices in different locations over long periods of time, however, it 
seems reasonable to infer the existence of barriers to arbitrage. 
It is, of course difficult empirically to isolate precisely equivalent products. 
A one-pound bag of  Colombian coffee sold by  a grocer in Tokyo is not the 
same product as a one-pound bag of Colombian coffee sold by  a grocer in 
New York. The products differ in the cost required for transportation and dis- 
tribution  to different locations.  In  addition,  they may be  associated with  a 
different degree of  service by  the store that  is selling them.  Nonetheless if 
there are no (or equivalent) barriers in both markets we would expect them to 
sell for the same price or for their prices to differ by no more than the costs of 
arbitrage between them. 
There is considerable evidence that the prices of goods are much higher in 
Japan than  in most other countries.  Table 1.4 compares the dollar prices of 
4. See the Saxonhouse comment on this paper below 26  Robert Z. Lawrence 
major expenditure categories in Japan with those in the United States and the 
EC as estimated on a purchasing-power-paity  basis by  the OECD. A sum- 
mary measure of goods prices in general is the purchasing-power-parity esti- 
mates used for deflating measures of inventories (of both consumer and pro- 
ducer  goods).  In  1985, by  this  indicator, goods  prices  in  Japan  were 25 
percent higher than they were in the United States and 42 percent higher than 
those in the European Community (OECD 1987). 
Table  1.4 reports the results of  calculations updating this estimate using 
1987 exchange rates and inflation rates in the United States and Japan. Given 
the decline of the dollar from 200.5 yen  in 1985 to an average of  123 yen in 
1987, this implies, measured in U.S. dollars, goods prices (as represented in 
inventories) in Japan were 75 percent higher than in the United States. 
In 1987, these calculations indicate that, compared with the United States, 
the cost of  food, clothing,  and fixed capital formation was 85, 62, and 76 
percent higher in Japan. As reported in table 1.4, purchasing-power estimates 
for all goods and services shows that in 1985, a year in which the dollar was 
strong, the overall Japanese price level for all goods and services was 7 per- 
cent lower than in the United States.  But even in  1985, the Japanese price 
level was 26 percent higher than in the European Community. In  1988, the 
OECD estimates the prices of  goods and services in Japan are 60 percent 
higher than in the United States. 
But these comparisons at the retail level are plagued with problems, partic- 
Table 1.4  Comparative Dollar Price Levels of Final Expenditure on GDP, 
United States = 100 
1985  1987 
EC  Japan  Japana 
Private final consumption expenditure 
Food, beverages, & tobacco 
Clothing and footwear 
Gross rent, fuel, and power 
Household equipment & operations 
Medical and health care 
Transport & communication 
Education, recreation, & culture 
Miscellaneous goods and services 
Net purchases abroad 



































Gross fixed capital formation  81  115  176 
Increase in stocks  88  125  175 
Gross domestic product  74  93  147 
Source: OECD (1987),  pp. 52-53. 
aAuthor’s calculations are based on data from OECD National Accounts, vol. 2,  1987 series 27  How Open Is Japan? 
Table 1.5  Wholesale and Retail Bade Margins 
Japan, 1985  United States, 1983 
Value  Value 
(in Trillions of  Yen)  Share  (in Billions of  U.S.$)  Share 
Intermediate inputs  20.122 
Real estate  2.815 
Value added  41.024 
Total output  61.146 
Final sales of  good  160.052 
Whole and retail margin  ,256 
Distribution margin  .38 
(C+I+G+X) 
.33  194.347  .34 
,046  27.609  .048 





Sources: For United States: Survey of Current Business (February 1989), Input-output table  I; 
Department of  Commerce, U.S. National Income Accounts. For Japan: Economic Statistics An- 
nual (March 1989), Input-output table; Economic Planning Agency Annual Report on National 
Accounts (1989), p. 174. 
ularly because distribution margins could, in  principle,  differ across coun- 
tries. Assume, for example, that the Japanese distribution sector is extremely 
ineffi~ient.~  The market could be completely open, but both foreign and do- 
mestic products could be subject to the same, extremely high costs of distri- 
bution. It could also be the case that the distribution system for these markets 
is highly competitive and markups have to be more expensive in Japan be- 
cause of  higher real estate costs; Japanese retail prices could be higher, but 
this would simply reflect the underlying economic costs of distribution. More- 
over, in this case, making the distribution system more “efficient”-through 
large stores and other changes in rules-might  improve Japanese living stan- 
dards tremendously but do little to raise the level of imports. 
I have therefore analyzed distribution margins using input-output tables in 
Japan and the United States. As reported in table  1.5, the payments by  the 
retail and wholesale trade for indirect inputs in both countries are remarkably 
similar-around  one-third of total output of these sectors. The payments by 
these sectors to the real estate sector are also remarkably similar shares of their 
output. Overall, as a share of total goods sales (domestic absorption plus mer: 
chandise exports), value added in wholesale and retail trade is 25.6 percent in 
Japan in 1985 and 22.7 percent in the United States in 1983. In 1987 the ratios 
for Japan and the United States were 26 and 24 percent respectively (Govern- 
ment of Japan 1989; U.S. Department of Commerce 1989). The more exten- 
sive analysis undertaken for this conference by  Ito and Maruyama (in this 
volume) comes to similar conclusions about Japanese margins in the distribu- 
tion sector. 
5. Aheam (1989) has argued, e.g., that the multitiered distribution system in Japan raises mark- 
ups on goods. 28  Robert Z. Lawrence 
The similarity in  distribution margins should not be taken as evidence of 
similarities in efficiency. If distribution margins are the same in Japan and the 
United States, but final goods are much higher in Japan, this implies higher 
prices are being paid both for manufacturing services and for distribution ser- 
vices.  Indeed,  using  purchasing power estimates,  according to the  OECD 
(1988), output per worker in Japanese distribution was 72 percent of  the U.S. 
level. The inefficiency in the Japanese distribution system is thus partly to 
blame for higher Japanese retail prices. But it is not the full story. Japanese 
manufacturers appear (on average) to charge prices in  Japan that are higher 
than those in world markets. This confirms, in aggregate, the anecdotal evi- 
dence,  discovered by  many  Japanese tourists,  of  what James Fallows has 
called the 47th Street photo phenomenon: some Japanese goods cost less in 
other countries than they do in Japan.  A survey of  the prices of the same 
products in Japan and the United States was conducted jointly by  the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and the Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry in 
1989. Of the Japanese products studied, 21 of 50 were cheaper in the United 
States than in Japan (by contrast, only four of  35 U.S. products studied were 
cheaper in Japan than in the United States; see table 1.6).6 
The comparative data on profit rates in manufacturing, as calculated by the 
OECD, lend further support to the notion that Japanese manufacturers have 
considerable market power. According to Chan-Lee and Sutch (1985), rates 
of return in Japanese manufacturing have typically been twice as high as those 
in  the United States and other industrial countries.’ Similarly, the share of 
profits in value added in Japanese manufacturing (48.7 percent) in  1987 was 
much higher than in the United States (28.8 percent). See table 1.7. 
But while distribution margins on products in Japan in general appear sim- 
ilar to those in the United States, this does not hold for margins on imported 
products. As reported  in a survey conducted by  the Ministry of  Trade and 
Industry, the prices of imported brand name goods in Japan are 30-60  percent 
higher than those in the USA and Europe. The study, conducted in November 
1988, compared prices of products in  11 categories such as perfume, hand- 
bags, fountain pens,  and golf clubs in five overseas cities and 41 Japanese 
cities. The survey showed that prices in New York, Paris, and Dusseldorf were 
38, 29, and 27 percent lower than those in Tokyo. 
Similarly, Ahearn (1989) cites a study by  the Economic Planning Agency 
that found that unregulated consumer goods (goods not subject to any restric- 
tions in Japan) were 36 percent more expensive in Japan in 1987 than in New 
York. Consumer goods that were subject to restrictions in Japan (e.g., food, 
liquor, and energy) were 92 percent more expensive. 
6. In  his comments on this paper, Gary Saxonhouse interprets the evidence from this survey as 
indicating that Japanese goods are typically not sold for higher prices in Japan. This ignores the 
more pervasive evidence in the purchasing-power-parity studies. 
7. Contrary to  the assertion in Saxonhouse’s comment on this paper (see below), the OECD 
does adjust its measures of  profits to take account of the self-employed. See, e.g.,  OECD (1990). 29  How Open Is Japan? 
Table 1.6  US.-Japan Product Price Comparison 
~~  ~~ 
% Lower 
Product  LowedJapan  Lowedunited States  Total  in United States 
Capital goods  7  15  22  68.18 
Food  1  22  23  95.65 
Miscellaneous  5  19  24  79.17 
Auto parts  2  9  11  81.82 
Autos  2  5  7  71.43 
Electronics  21  14  35  40.00 
Total  38  84  122  68.85 
Source: Joint Survey of  U.S.  Department of  Commerce and Ministry of  International Trade and 
Industry (MITI). 
Table 1.7  Profit Share and Rates of Return in Manufacturing (%) 
1960s  1970s  1980/ 
Average  Average  1984  1986  1987 
Profit  Rate of  Profit  Rate of  Profit  Profit  Profit 
Share  Return  Share  Return  Share  Share  Share 
--- 
Japan  58.3  36.5a  50.8  26.4  48.4  47.9  48.7 
United States  31.1  22.2  27.8  16.8  25.7  39.1  28.8 
Germany  45.8  20.9  36.9  15.7  32.9  36.6  36.9 
France  41.6  15.6  31.9  16.0  37.4  32.1  32.1 
Sources:  “Underlying  Data  for Indexes of  Output per Hour,  Hourly Compensation,  and Unit 
Labor Costs in  Manufacturing  Twelve Industrial Countries,  1950-1988,”  U.S.  Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Productivity and Technology, June 1989. Also, Chan- 
Lee and Sutch 1985. 
Note:  Profit share = gross operating  surplus as a percentage of  value added. Calculated from 
data from Department of Labor. Rate of return  = gross operating surplus as a ratio of the gross 
capital stock. From Chan-Lee and Sutch. 
“1965-69. 
In its survey, the OECD (1988, p. 81) found car prices (net of  sales taxes) 
of German autos to be significantly more expensive in Japan than in the United 
States or France. The OECD suggests part of the explanation is the toleration 
of  sole-agent contracts that allow the importer and/or the producer to restrict 
supply and earn monopoly profits. Finally, as reported in table 1  .5 above, the 
joint survey by MITI and the U.S. Department of Commerce in  1989, which 
examined  122 products found  84  priced  higher in  Japan than  the  United 
States. Accordingly, it appears that many imported products in Japan are sub- 
ject to higher markups than other Japanese products. According to Christelow 
(1985-86),  “A [ 1985 Japanese] Government survey of distribution markups 
for domestic and imported products found that for whiskeys, candies, edible 30  Robert Z. Lawrence 
oils, men’s overcoats and footwear, markups on imports were double those on 
domestic products.” 
It is hard to understand, in the face of  this evidence, how Japan could ex- 
hibit “normal” import behavior when the evidence on differential pricing is so 
strong.  In  principle,  in  an  open market,  over  long  periods of  time,  there 
should be major opportunities for arbitrage. 
1.2.2  Prices Responses 
Price levels can differ, but since it is difficult to isolate these, useful infor- 
mation can be obtained from the responses of prices to shocks. That is, if the 
marginal costs of  producing a product change, in open markets, one would 
expect similar price responses. If  markets are fmgmented and producers ca- 
pable of pricing to market, one might see very different responses. As Mar- 
ston (in this volume) and others have shown, Japanese export prices are char- 
acterized by this type of  behavior. 
In his comments on this paper, Gary Saxonhouse argues that these higher 
prices  on  imports  reflect  the  marketing  strategies of  foreign oligopolistic 
firms. However, as I have demonstrated above, foreign goods in Japan are 
overwhelmingly marketed not by foreign firms but by  Japanese distributors. 
This is why, contrary to his assertions, it is significant that Japanese importers 
take title to their goods in the United States. If they are bringing in the goods, 
they are earning the rents from the higher markups, and the Japanese distri- 
bution system operates like a privately administered set of tariffs. 
1.3  Adjustment 
Some of the barriers that allegedly inhibit the entry of imported products in 
Japan will function like quotas. In particular, administrative guidance or buy- 
ing cartels may not be responsive to price changes. Other barriers may lead to 
high domestic products (as do tariffs) but may nonetheless be compatible with 
adjustments to price changes.  Indeed, if  an imported product is sold by  an 
agent with a monopoly over its distribution, the agent will generally apply a 
higher markup on that product than if distribution was competitive. Nonethe- 
less, if  the agent’s costs declined (in the face of a constant elasticity of de- 
mand), we would expect a proportional decline in the price charged to con- 
sumers. Similarly, as Becker (1971) has noted in his theory of discrimination, 
if consumers have a preference for buying domestic products, ceteris paribus, 
they will not necessarily be less responsive at the margin to changes in relative 
price of imported products. 
A major reason given for the adoption of  dramatically new U.S. policies 
toward Japan is the assertion that the Japanese economy fails to respond to 
relative price changes. Support for this view is derived from the apparent lack 
of adjustment in the U.S.-Japan  bilateral trade deficit-measured  in U.S. dol- 
lars. But it should be stressed that since the devaluation of the dollar has taken 31  How Open Is Japan? 
place from a position of substantial initial imbalance, the failure of the trade 
deficit to decline in dollars is not necessarily indicative of a lack of adjustment 
in Japan. If the U.S. import demand elasticity is close to unity, as it appears to 
be, measured in dollars, imports from Japan will not be affected by  changes 
in the exchange rate. This means that all of the decline in the Japanese surplus 
has to come from a rise in the value of U.S. exports to Japan. Since, in 1985, 
when U.S. exports to Japan (of $22.6 billion) were 31.3 percent of U.S. im- 
ports from Japan ($72.4 billion), exports have to grow over three times as fast 
as imports,  simply to stay even. The fact that the nominal trade deficit has 
remained fairly constant actually indicates a dramatic increase in the value of 
U.S. exports to Japan. 
Indeed,  between  1985 and  1988, according  to  the  U.S. Department  of 
Commerce (1989), U.S.  exports  to Japan  increased from  $22.6 billion to 
$37.7 billion.  Similarly, U.S. manufactured goods imports increased from 
$12.3 billion to $22 billion-a  rise of 79 percent in a period of relative price 
stability. Over this same period, according to the Economic Planning Agency 
of  Japan, the volume of Japanese imports increased by  39.4 percent and the 
overall volume of Japanese imports of manufactured goods increased by 78.3 
percent. 
In  1987 I wrote a paper that suggested that Japanese imports of  manufac- 
tured goods were “unusually” low by about 40 percent in 1980.  This number 
has now  been subject to considerable abuse.  Since the volume of  Japanese 
manufactured imports has increased by  over this amount since  1985, some 
have used this result to suggest that the levels of Japanese manufactured goods 
are now “normal” (see, e.g., Japan-U.S.  Business Council 1989). But an ap- 
plication of the methodology I used in that paper would not endorse this con- 
clusion. Since the study was cross-sectional it used nominal data measured in 
domestic currencies. In  1980, as measured by the OECD, imports accounted 
for 5.8 percent of Japanese expenditures on manufactured products. In  1985 
they accounted for 5.3 percent.  Using Japanese National Income Accounts 
data (Government of Japan 1989), I estimate, on a similar basis, that the share 
in 1987 was actually 7.5 percent lower than in 1985. Measured on the OECD 
basis this would entail a share of roughly 4.9 percent. The reason is that, for 
purposes of  this calculation, the yen value of manufactured imports is rele- 
vant. 
Nonetheless, as the Japanese trade data indicate, it would be inappropriate 
to argue that there has been no response in manufactured imports into Japan. 
In fact, measured in  1980 prices,  data from the National Income Accounts 
suggest that the share of imported manufactured goods products spending in 
Japan increased by 36 percent from 6.0 to 8.2 percent of domestic absorption. 
In my  1987 paper, I also observed that imports into Japan were as respon- 
sive to relative price changes as imports in other industrial countries. Table 
1.8 reports a set of  regressions that  indicate that the response  in Japanese 
manufactured goods to the rise in the yen and the rapid expansion in domestic Table 1.8  Japanese Manufactured Import Equations (Volume), Annual Data 
(I-statistics in parentheses) 
Constant  LIP  LDD  LREX  LRPM  D86  D87  D88  R2  SE  D-W  p 
1970/85, Eq.  I  1.77  2.02  1.004  .14  .07  .1  I  .994  ,0507  1.4  .58 
1971/85, Eq. 2  4.3  1.54  1.02  .07  .05  .16  ,993  ,053  1.7  .46 
1970/85, Eq. 3  -  14.6  2.08  .89  .06  .OOl  .09  ,977  ,097  1.9  .3  1 
1970/85, Eq. 4  -9.5  1.76  .71  .02  .05  .I7  ,973  ,101  1.9  .21 
1970/85, Eq. 5  .2  1.86  .I8  1.004  .I3  .06  .1  ,994  ,053  1.44  .52 
1971/85, Eq. 6  11.3  2.1  -  .88  1.34  ,097  .07  .18  .995  ,046  1.7  .53 
1970/88, Eq. 7  -2.4  1.72  .42  1.08  ,991  ,056  1.8  .46 
(1.5)  (16.5)  (4.2)  (2.4)  (.94)  (1.3) 
(6.4)  (8.2)  (4.1)  (1.1)  (.8)  (1.9) 
(5.1)  (10.9)  (2.1)  (5)  (.06)  (6 
(2.9)  (4.4)  (1.4)  (.14)  (.41)  (1.2) 
(.05)  (5.2)  (.48)  (4.0)  (2.0)  (.69)  (1.1) 
(3.1)  (6.4)  (-2.03)  (5.04)  (1.6)  (1.1)  (2.3) 
(4.7)  (4.7)  (1.1)  (4.7) 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook Database and JP Morgan (real exchange rate). 
Nore: IP = industrial production; DD = final domestic demand (C +  I +  G); REX = real exchange rate; RPM  = ratio of wholesale 
prices to manufactured import prices; D86 = dummy variable for 1986; D87  = dummy variable for 1987; D88 = dummy variable 
for 1988; L = logarithms. 33  How Open Is Japan'? 
demand between  1985 and  1988 was actually somewhat faster than might 
have been expected on the basis of the historic relationship (a similar conclu- 
sion is reached by Corker 1989). The regressions, specified in logarithms so 
the coefficients may be interpreted as elasticities, explain the volume of Japa- 
nese manufactured goods imports as a function of  an activity and relative 
pricekost variable. Because of endogeneity problems, there are well-known 
problems associated with providing structural interpretations to such regres- 
sions, but they are nonetheless interesting as statistical summaries of the his- 
toric relationships between the variables. I have experimented using two prox- 
ies for activity: industrial production and domestic final demand. The former 
will capture the role of imports as inputs into industrial production, the latter 
as components of  domestic absorption. Generally, the industrial production 
variable provided a better fit (compare, e.g., eqq.  [l] and [3]). When both 
variables are inserted in the equation, the coefficient on final demand is not 
significant (eq. [5]).  However, when estimated with the period 1986-88,  the 
coefficient on domestic demand increases from .I8 to .42 although it is still 
not significant. 
The real exchange-rate variable (the ratio of  Japanese to foreign manufac- 
tured goods prices in yen) estimated with a current and one year lag has coef- 
ficients that sum to about unity (see eqq. [l], [3], and [5]).  This cost formu- 
lation is less  subject to  simultaneity bias  than  the price variable  and  also 
provides a slightly more robust coefficient and a smaller standard error. But 
the specifications are all interesting in showing not only that Japanese manu- 
factured imports are responsive to changes in relative prices and real exchange 
rates but also that the recent rise in manufactured imports is higher than might 
have been expected, given this historic relationship. An out-of-sample fore- 
cast of the volume of manufactured imports given the actual behavior of do- 
mestic activity and relative prices underpredicts the volume of  manufactured 
imports in  1988 by  between 9 and  18 percent (see the coefficients on the 
dummy variables for 1988). 
1.3.1  Corporate Role 
Judged by  the volume of  products being  sold, the Japanese economy is 
becoming more open. But what about the corporate role? There is consider- 
able anecdotal evidence that Japanese investment in foreign beef  stockyards 
in the United States and Australia has increased in response to the anticipated 
opening of  the beef market. Similarly, that Japanese investment in citrus or- 
chards has increased in response to the potential in that market. But what does 
the aggregate data indicate? 
Unfortunately, the data that are available are limited. But they do suggest 
that the Japanese corporate role in Japanese imports is declining. As reported 
in table 1.9, in  1985 almost 70 percent of  U.S. exports to Japan was shipped 
by  a Japanese affiliate in the United States to its Japanese parent. In 1986 the 
share of Japanese affiliates was 58.4 percent and in  1987 the share was 39.6 34  Robert Z. Lawrence 
Table 1.9  Percentage of U.S. Exports and Imports with Affiliates of Foreign 
Multinational Corporations, by Area of Affiliates, for 1983-87 
Exports  Imports 
EC  Japan  World  EC  Japan  World 
1981  11.9  75.1  11.5  37.7  69.4  20.0 
1982  16.1  65.5  11.8  37.1  71.4  21.3 
1983  12.2  63.9  11.3  35.4  68.8  21.2 
1984  15.0  66.9  12.4  30.8  67.7  21.6 
1985  13.7  69.7  12.2  29.5  69.6  23.7 
1986  11.6  58.4  11.6  29.8  66.1  25.4 
1987  7.5  39.6  7.7  31.5  67.3  26.2 
Source: Survey of Current Business,  Department of Commerce, various issues. 
percent. Between 1986 and 1987, U.S. exports to Japan increased from $26.9 
billion to $28.2 billion. The decline in the share of U.S.  exports shipped by 
Japanese foreign affiliates indicates that the dollar value of their sales actually 
declined quite considerably. The hold of  the general trading companies ap- 
pears to be slipping. And, indeed, there are reports of them seeking a variety 
of new business opportunities (see Choy 1988). 
The trading companies’ role is particularly conspicuous, for Japanese data 
show and U.S. data suggest that,  while the overall share of  intrafirm ship- 
ments by Japanese firms in Japanese imports has declined, the share shipped 
by  the foreign affiliates of Japanese manufacturing companies-so-called  re- 
verse imports-is  growing. According to a survey conducted by MITI (1989) 
of  the overseas activities of  Japanese businesses, reverse imports accounted 
for 5.3 percent of all Japanese imports and 11.5 percent of all manufactured 
goods imports in fiscal year 1987. While this share was relatively low, it has 
been rising rapidly. The 1987 total of  Y  1.18 trillion was a 45 percent increase 
over the total for fiscal year  1986, when reverse imports accounted for 9.2 
percent of all Japanese manufactured imports. 
On the other hand, as reported in table 1.10, the intrafirm trade from par- 
ents in the U.S. to their affiliates located in Japan has increased steadily, from 
11  .O percent in 1983 to 14.8 percent in  1985 and 17.3 percent in 1987.* 
Finally, it is noteworthy that U.S. exports have surged in sectors in which 
negotiations  to  change  the  rules  have  been  concluded.  According to  the 
ACTPN (1989) report, after 10 years of pressure, it concludes that virtually 
all barriers to the importation of  tobacco into Japan have fallen. The four 
sectors that  were  singled out  for  negotiation under the maligned Market- 
Opening, Sector-Specific (MOSS) talks in the mid-1980s have shown impres- 
8. The major rise in U.S. exports to Japan actually came between 1987 and 1988. During this 
period,  U.S.  manufacturing  exports to Japan increased from $16.3 to $21.96 billion while the 
total value of exports increased from $28.2 to $37.7 billion. Unfortunately, data on the corporate 
involvement in trade was not available when this paper was compiled. 35  How Open Is Japan? 
Table 1.10  Percentage of U.S.  Exports and Imports with Affiliates of U.S. 
Multinational Corporations, by Area of Afliliates, for 1983-87 
~~ 
Exports  Imports 
EC (12)  Japan  World  EC (12)  Japan  World 
1983  39.5  11.0  28.7  15.  I  9.4  20.6 
1984  38.2  12.3  30.4  13.7  7.2  19.2 
1985  39.7  14.8  32.7  14.7  9.2  19.7 
1986  36.9  13.6  32.8  12.2  8.9  17.7 
1987  36.3  17.3  31.0  14.5  10.9  18.6 
Source: Survey of  Current Business,  Department of  Commerce, various issues. 
sive growth in Japanese imports. According to the report, from 1985 to 1987, 
U.S. exports to Japan in the four product categories, combined, increased by 
46.5 percent, well above the 24. 8 percent increase in total U.S.  exports to 
Japan over the same period. The report dismisses this performance because 
the total increase in exports of  the products (of $1.3 billion) was small relative 
to the entire bilateral trade imbalance. But no one expected negotiations in a 
few sectors to turn the entire imbalance around. The problem may not be the 
approach, that is, emphasizing rules,  but the limited resources and narrow 
focus of the number of  sectors brought into consideration. We  need not only 
tough, persistent negotiations but enough patience to let the results begin to 
build. 
1.3.2  Concluding Remarks 
Traditionally, U. S. policy has sought a more open Japanese market for for- 
eign firms and products by negotiating rules that would remove barriers. But 
demands are growing for the United States to seek managed trade agreements 
that ensure results. Some results-oriented approaches might open the Japanese 
market in the sense of  increasing the demand for U.S. products; others might 
increase the profits of U.S. firms. But they are unlikely to open the market in 
the crucial sense of  making Japanese markets genuinely contestable by  for- 
eigners. Indeed, a results-oriented approach is likely to lead to a market with 
more rather than less Japanese government and corporate control. 
How  open is Japan? Several noteworthy features have emerged from the 
data, and three point to the role still left to play by the removal of barriers: (1) 
Imports continue to account for an unusually small share of Japanese expend- 
itures on manufactured products. (2) Barriers continue to inhibit the interna- 
tional arbitrage of prices differences between Japan and other markets. And 
(3) the intrafirm shipments of Japanese firms continue to account for an un- 
usually high share of Japanese imports. 
But there are also signs that, since 1985, the Japanese economy has made 
major adjustments. (I) the Japanese economy has undergone a major adjust- 36  Robert Z. Lawrence 
ment in response to the strengthening of the yen. According to the Japanese 
Economic Planning Agency, in the first quarter of  1989, Japan imported twice 
the volume of  manufactured goods it imported in 1985. (2) Japanese manufac- 
turing firms are playing an increasing role in “reverse imports.” (3) U.S. affil- 
iates based in Japan are raising their share of U.S. exports. And (4) the intra- 
firm shipments of Japanese trading companies has declined conspicuously. 
Those who claim exchange rates do not change Japanese buying patterns have 
simply not examined the data. 
In the light of this evidence, it is not surprising that the trade disputes be- 
tween Japan and the United States about the closed nature of  the Japanese 
market continue. But it is surprising, given the major shifts in Japanese behav- 
ior that have taken place over the past few years, that some Americans feel so 
exasperated that they are driven to advocate an entirely new  approach that 
emphasizes results rather than rules. 
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Comment  GUY R. Saxonhouse 
Robert Lawrence reviews once again an issue that has been  much debated 
throughout the 1980s. He asks whether Japan, either by government action or 
by the private exercise of market power, interferes with the access of foreign 
products and/or foreign firms to its domestic markets. 
Lawrence makes a special effort to emphasize the distinction between ac- 
cess to the Japanese market for foreign products and access for foreign firms. 
Foreign firms may have access to the Japanese market, but they might exploit 
this access by marketing goods produced largely in Japan. Alternatively, for- 
eign goods may gain access to Japan as the by-product of intrafirm transac- 
tions between Japan and its overseas affiliates without foreign firms necessar- 
ily having access at all. Lawrence argues persuasively that the type of access 
foreigners have to the Japanese market has important implications for the eco- 
nomic welfare and income distribution of both Japan and its trading partners. 
Japanese trade is distinctive, Lawrence finds, because foreign exports to 
Japan have generally been  shipped by  foreign affiliates of  Japanese firms. 
Whereas international vertical integration generally proceeds forward from 
producers to markets, in Japan it appears to proceed backward from control of 
markets to sources of supply. 
Lawrence thinks that this distinctive pattern of  backward vertical integra- 
tion in turn may be responsible for Japan’s distinctively meager participation 
in  intra-industry  trade.  When  intrafirm imports are dominated by  foreign 
firms, new varieties of products presently produced domestically will be im- 
ported. If  intrafirm imports are dominated by domestic firms, such imports, 
Lawrence argues, will consist primarily of inputs that are found to be cheaper 
abroad or imports of  varieties produced by  the domestic firms that can be 
manufactured more cheaply abroad.  Intrafirm shipments by  domestic firms 
are much  less likely to result in  the importation of  new varieties produced 
abroad, which compete directly with domestic production. 
While in Japan vertical integration moves distinctively backward from sales 
in domestic market to foreign suppliers, it also proceeds forward from domes- 
tic producer to overseas market. Like Japanese imports, Lawrence finds that 
Japanese exports are also heavily dominated by intrafirm transactions. Such 
evidence, Lawrence notes, is consistent with well-known survey evidence by 
Mordechai Kreinin, which finds that Japanese purchasing behavior, in gen- 
eral, differs from that of other countries even where the purchases are made 
abroad.  Kreinin finds that Japanese firms abroad have an unusually strong 
preference to buy from other Japanese rather than from foreign suppliers. 
Lawrence believes that not only do foreign firms play a distinctively small 
role in Japan’s international trade, he also believes that foreign products have 
a distinctively low share of Japan’s domestic market. Citing a paper by T.  N. 
Srinivasan and Koichi Hamada, Lawrence finds the econometric evidence to 
Gary R. Saxonhouse is professor of economics at the University of  Michigan. 39  How Open Is Japan? 
be  inconclusive on whether,  after allowance is made for Japan’s distinctive 
national endowments, particularly its lack of natural resources, there is really 
anything distinctive about Japan’s trade structure. 
Lawrence prefers to look directly at cross-national price differences to un- 
cover whether or not foreign products’ access to the Japanese market is re- 
stricted. While it is often difficult to assemble comparable price data across 
countries, Lawrence feels enough evidence is available to conclude that there 
are large and persistent price differences between Japan and other countries 
that  cannot  be  accounted for by  higher distribution margins  or real  estate 
costs. He concludes that Japanese manufacturers charge higher prices for the 
goods they sell in Japan than for the goods they sell in the rest of the world. 
In consequence, Lawrence notes that it is not  surprising that the profits of 
Japanese manufacturers as a proportion of value added are unduly large by 
international standards.  Potential arbitrage opportunities between  the Japa- 
nese market and the rest of the world are not being fully exploited. 
While Lawrence finds considerable evidence that leads him to conclude that 
Japanese markets are not genuinely contestable by foreign products or foreign 
markets,  he appears to be impressed by  the capacity for change within the 
Japanese economy. He finds that many of the barriers to the Japanese market 
operate like tariffs rather than quotas. They keep imported products expensive 
in Japan, but they do not prevent marginal responses to price and costs incen- 
tives. The exchange rate changes in the mid-1980s have resulted in a dramatic 
increase in the total volume of manufactured goods imported into Japan over 
the past  four years.  At a sectoral level, where tangible barriers  have been 
removed as a result of  negotiations, significant increases in imports have re- 
sulted. Given the major shifts in Japanese behavior that have taken place over 
the past few years, Lawrence finds it surprising that some Americans feel so 
exasperated as to advocate an entirely new approach to dealing with U.S.- 
Japan economic relations. 
Intrafirm Ikansactions 
While Lawrence’s analysis is full of good insight and is highly plausible, it 
is  possible  also to disagree with  some of the inferences he draws from the 
evidence he  has assembled  and, indeed,  with  some of  the evidence itself. 
While an unusually large share of Japanese imports are the result of intrafirm 
transactions,  it is not at all clear that these transactions represent backward 
vertical integration in the way that term is normally understood. These intra- 
firm transactions, by and large, are neither the purchases of  Japanese manu- 
facturing firms, nor of Japan retailers, nor the sale of goods produced by their 
overseas subsidiaries and affiliates. While this may change in the 1990s, by 
comparison with firms in other major industrialized countries, firms with es- 
tablished positions in the Japanese market have only rarely found it profitable 
to integrate backward into production entities abroad. In  1987 only 5.3%  of 
Japanese imports were intrafirm transactions of goods produced by Japanese 40  Robert Z. Lawrence 
entities abroad. By contrast, for the United States in 1987, no less than 18.4% 
of  all imports were the result of  intrafirm transactions of  goods produced 
abroad by American subsidiaries and aililiates.’ 
Intrafirm transactions dominate Japanese imports only because Japanese 
importers are taking title to their goods abroad rather than when they reach 
Japanese ports. That Japanese importers happen to take title to their goods via 
separately incorporated subsidiaries in Los Angeles rather than directly in Yo- 
kohama is by itself, not very significant  at all. While issues may remain about 
the volume and composition of Japanese imports, a distinctively high propor- 
tion of the imports that do reach the Japanese market are produced by foreign- 
owned firms. 
Japanese keiretsu 
Intrafirm transactions play such a large role in Japan’s foreign trade because 
of Japan’s giant general trading companies. In 1986, Japan’s nine largest trad- 
ing companies handled 66% of all Japanese imports. Is it possible that Japa- 
nese trading companies restrict what they import, not so much to protect their 
own domestic production, of which they do little, but rather to protect the 
interests of other firms to which they are tied through their keiretsu aililiation? 
In considering this possibility, it is important to keep some perspective on the 
strength of  keiretsu ties. Japan has many keiretsu of one type or another, but 
currently the six best known are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Dai- 
Ichi Kangyo, and Sanwa. Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo are directly de- 
scended from the prewar zaibatsu, which SCAP (Supreme Command of the 
Allied Powers) tried to break up during the American Occupation of Japan. 
By  contrast, the Fuyo, Dai-Ichi Kangyo, and Sanwa keiretsu, were formed 
largely in the years after  1945. Members of all six keiretsu are much less 
closely tied  than is generally realized. The member firms in keiretsu with 
strong prewar roots purchase only 14.8% of their procurement from fellow 
keiretsu members.  For the more recently  organized keiretsu, procurement 
from fellow keiretsu members is still less important. Only 8.9% of procure- 
ment is purchased from affiliated firms2 
While reciprocal purchasing seems to be too weak to tie keiretsu together, 
it is often suggested that cross-shareholding among member firms does allow 
the keiretsu as a whole effective control over any individual-member  firm. In 
fact, cross-shareholding is not nearly as pervasive or so exclusive among kei- 
retsu members as is commonly believed. Among the six best-known keiretsu, 
1. Gary R. Saxonhouse, “Kawase reeto, kozo chosei to Taiheiyo chiiki ni okeru sankaku boeki” 
(Exchange rates, structural change and triangular trade in the  Pacific region), Keizui shakei sei- 
suku (Economy, society and  policy) no. 205 (May 1989). 
2. Kosei torihiki iinkai (Fair  Trade Commission), Kigyo shudan m  jitrui ni mire  (The structure 
of enterprise groups) (Tokyo: Kosei torihiki kyokai, 1983), pp. 39-42. 41  How Open Is Japan? 
the average of a member firm’s equity held by all other members of its keiretsu 
is 17.9%.3  While this may be a relatively small amount of cross-shareholding, 
if  ownership of the firm’s  remaining equity is widely dispersed, this may be 
sufficient to give the keiretsu control of the member firm. In fact, for the typi- 
cal member firm, the main holders of equity outside of the keiretsu are char- 
acteristically members of other keiret~u.~  These holdings, if exercised in con- 
cert, are sufficient to block keiretsu control of member firms. 
Keiretsu  ties  have  substance  where member firms are dependent on the 
keiretsu main bank  for their finance. Dependence on these main banks has 
declined dramatically over the past fifteen years.  Between  1972 and  1983, 
over one-quarter of the companies listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange changed  their main  bank.  This weakening  of  keiretsu  ties goes 
hand in hand with the declining dependence of large Japanese firms on kei- 
retsu banks. In 1974, Japanese firms, capitalized at more than one billion yen, 
relied on banks for 46.7% of their new financing. Just 10 years later no more 
than 2.6% of new investment by these large Japanese firms was financed by 
bank borrowing  .6 
If keiretsu ties are relatively weak, if such ties have been made still weaker 
by  financial deregulation,  and  if reciprocal purchasing  by  keiretsu  member 
firms is a relatively minor matter, it is hard to believe that Japan’s distinctive 
trade structure can be explained by Japan’s trading companies exercising what 
market power they have to protect their fellow keiretsu members by discrimi- 
nating  in their purchases against competitive imports.  As noted,  Lawrence 
does cite Mordechai Kreinin’s case study of foreign investment in Australia as 
persuasive evidence in support of discriminatory purchasing of goods and ser- 
vices by  Japanese companies.  Unfortunately, not only does Kreinin’s study 
not square with what is known about keiretsu behavior in the 1980s, it does 
not  square with Lawrence’s own study of Japanese foreign investment in the 
U.S. In this study, Lawrence notes 
Although it is widely perceived that Japanese-affiliated automakers depend 
overwhelmingly on parts bought  from Japanese-affiliated suppliers, a de- 
tailed  GAO survey calls this perception into question.  It found, for ex- 
ample, that of the  119 U.S.-based suppliers used by Honda, only 28 had 
Japanese affiliations. Similarly 15 of Nissan’s 121 suppliers were Japanese- 
affiliated and 8 of the 60 suppliers used by Toyota were Japanese affiliated.’ 
3. Toyo keizai  (Oriental  Economist),  Kigyo keiretsu  soran  (Handbook  of  industrial groups) 
4. Ken-ichi Imai, “Kigyo gurupu” (Enterprise groups), in Nihon no kigyo (The Japanese firm), 
5. Kigyo keiretsu soran. 
6. Nihon ginko (Bank of  Japan) “Shuyo kigyo keiei bunseki” (Analysis of the performance of 
7. Robert Z. Lawrence, “Japanese Affiliated Automakers in the United States: An Appraisal” 
(Tokyo, 1989). 
ed. Ken-ichi Imai and Ryutaro Komiya (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai,  1989). 
major companies), Keizgi rokei nenkan (Economic statistics yearbook) (Tokyo, 1989). 
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Not only does Lawrence find, contrary to Kreinin, that Japanese firms do 
not  rely  primarily  on Japanese  suppliers,  he  also finds,  again contrary  to 
Kreinin, that (1) value added by Japanese firms in the United States is high; 
(2) Japanese firms do considerable research and development and design work 
in the United States, and (3) Japanese firms rely heavily on American man- 
agers. 
In general, findings such as Kreinin’s can be explained on grounds that have 
little to do with discriminatory or restrictive practices by Japanese firms and 
groups. Most Japanese manufacturing investments in Australia  are of quite 
recent origin and are designed to produce substitutes for products that were 
recently exported (and indeed continue to be exported) to Australia from Ja- 
pan. Japan continues to retain (or until recently retained) a comparative advan- 
tage in most of what it is producing in Australia. Japanese manufacturing in 
Australia is an effort to put more value added into the Australian economy. By 
contrast, much of the European and American direct investments in Australia 
with which Kreinin compares Japanese practices were made a decade or more 
(in some instances six or seven decades) ago. While originally substitutes for 
exports, many of these investments are in product lines where the home coun- 
try of the firm making the investment has long since lost much of its compar- 
ative advantage. It is hardly surprising that, unlike the Australian subsidiaries 
of  Japanese  firms,  the  Australian  subsidiaries of  European  and  American 
firms should have to source broadly in order to retain their local market share. 
Kreinin’s findings for Australia are entirely consistent with the traditional 
histories of multinational corporations and overseas direct investment and do 
not suggest truly distinctive Japanese practices.8 The early history of Ford and 
General Motors, among other American enterprises in Japan, is hardly differ- 
ent from the Japanese experience.  More generally, this issue comes up so 
often in the experience of so many firms and host countries that it is hardly 
surprising that there are hundreds of  local content laws on national  statute 
books throughout the world. 
Econometric Studies on Japanese ’bade Volume and ’bade Structure 
If  keiretsu ties are weaker and Japanese firm procurement behavior appear 
to be far less discriminatory than is generally supposed, it may not be so sur- 
prising to find that there are now quite a few econometric studies (including a 
number by me) that show, after allowance is made for Japan’s distinctive na- 
tional endowments, particularly its lack of natural resources, that there is rel- 
atively little that is really distinctive about Japan’s trade structure. While it is 
certainly true that there are studies (including one in 1987 by Lawrence hirn- 
self) that come up with contrary findings, it is not entirely fair to argue that 
since some econometric issues can be raised about all of these studies, they 
8. Mira Wilkins, The Maturing of  Multinational Enrerprise: American Business Abroad, 1914- 
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should all be discounted. Some econometric issues are more important than 
others. The Srinivasan and Hamada survey, which Lawrence cites, certainly 
does not view all these studies as equally flawed. After noting that “except for 
the study by Leamer [which like my study is dubious about the extent of Jap- 
anese underimporting] and arguably by Saxonhouse, the others are subject to 
a number of estimation biases.” They conclude that “the empirical support in 
favor or against the hypothesis that Japanese are underimporting is subject to 
criticisms which are most damaging particularly to studies in favor of the hy- 
pothesis .” 
Lawrence may find this conclusion surprising, but only because he may be 
misinterpreting the Srinivasan and Hamada comments on  my  work. While 
Srinivasan and Hamada are uneasy about my  cavalierly assuming away the 
consequences of leaving out, because of the unavailability of data, those fac- 
tor endowments that would allow my Heckscher-Ohlin specification to have 
the same number of  goods as factors (Leamer also assumes away this prob- 
lem), they reserve most of their attention to my use of forecast intervals. It is 
clear I should be using tolerance intervals rather than forecast intervals when 
conducting my tests on the distinctiveness of Japanese trade behavior. Given 
my  findings, however, my  failure to use tolerance intervals should make no 
difference at all. Except for the case when the sample size is infinite, for any 
given probability, the forecast interval will always be smaller than the toler- 
ance interval.I0 Since I find Japan to fall within the forecast interval, it will 
also fall within the tolerance interval. In neither case will Japan be the outlier. 
Price Differentials 
While weak keiretsu ties make studies that find little evidence of Japanese 
underimporting all the more plausible, Lawrence is entirely correct to argue 
that if there are persistent price differentials between Japan and other countries 
for comparable products the credibility of  such studies is weakened. It has 
long been appreciated that cross-national price differentials are a good way to 
measure the impact of nontariff barriers.  Unhappily, the absence of  strictly 
comparable cross-national price data has made it difficult to use this approach. 
For example, during the past year, much has been made of  the so-called 
“Forty-Seventh Street Photo phenomenon,” which claims that Japanese prod- 
ucts, in  general, and cameras, in particular, are sold abroad at lower prices 
than at home.  l2 Many Japanese government officials have vehemently rejected 
9. T. N. Srinivasan and Koichi  Hamada, “The U.S.-Japan Trade Problem” (Yale University, 
10. Carl Christ, Econometric Models and Methods (New York: Wiley), pp. 549-65. 
1 1. Alan V.  DeardorE and Robert N. Stem, “Methods of Measurement of Non-Tariff Barriers,” 
University of Michigan Institute of Public Policy Studies Discussion Paper no. 203 (June 1984); 
Gary R. Saxonhouse, “What’s Wrong with Japanese Trade Structure?” Pacific Economic Papers 
mimeograph), pp. 3, 36. 
(July 1986):  1-36. 
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this claim, arguing that the products being priced cross-nationally are simply 
not  comparable. For example,  they  argue that Forty-Seventh Street Photo 
charges low prices only because it  is  selling older models of  cameras no 
longer desired by  the Japanese consumer. This controversy bubbled over in 
the U. S.  -Japan Structural Impediments Initiative discussions in  the fall of 
1989. As an outcome of this controversy, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
and Japan’s Ministry of  International Trade and Industry (MITI) agreed to 
undertake a detailed joint price survey that would take special pains to price 
comparable products in the United States and Japan. 
The survey actually conducted appears to have been scrupulous in its efforts 
to obtain comparable retail price data. Considerable effort has been extended 
to insure that comparable products are being priced in comparable retail loca- 
tions. Price observations have been segregated according to whether they have 
been taken in speciality shops, discount houses, or department stores. Unfor- 
tunately, the products included in this survey are in no sense a random sample 
of  the universe of  comparable products available in  the U.S.  and Japanese 
markets. Rather they are the outcome of  weeks of  acrimonious negotiation 
between the Department of Commerce and MITI. Indeed, the final list could 
not be agreed upon until the day before the survey started. 
The actual survey results contain some surprises. While there are certainly 
many instances of Japanese goods having lower prices in the United States 
than in Japan, the Forty-Seventh Street Photo phenomenon is not pervasive 
even at Forty-Seventh Street Photo. Of  14 Japanese-produced cameras and 
video-camera-related products, six are cheaper in the United States. Overall, 
26 of 57 Japanese products have been found to be cheaper in the United States 
than in Japan. By striking contrast, only four of  35 U.S. products and only 
two of 21 European products are cheaper in Japan than in the United States.I3 
Simply counting up observations of what, in any event, is not a randomly 
drawn sample may yield a misleading impression. William R. Cline of  the 
Institute for International Economics has analyzed the determinants of  the 
U.S.  and  Japanese price differences found  in  this ~amp1e.l~  Cline rejects 
the Forty-Seventh Street Photo phenomenon and finds that there is no statisti- 
cally significant difference between U.S. and Japanese retail prices for goods 
produced in Japan. By contrast, the hypothesis that there are no statistically 
significant differences between U.S. and Japanese retail prices for goods pro- 
duced in the United States and Europe cannot be accepted. 
Cline’s results present a problem for those who would argue that the Japa- 
nese market for manufactured products is highly protected. If  the Japanese 
market is highly protected, both Japanese and foreign products should have 
much higher prices in Japan than abroad. That only foreign products have high 
13. U.S. Department of  Commerce and Japan  Ministry of  International Trade and Industry, 
14. William R. Cline, “Japan’s Trade Policies” (paper delivered to  Ministry  of International 
Joint Survey on United States and Japanese Retail Prices (Washington, D.C.,  November 1989). 
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prices in Japan suggests a different interpretation. The high prices for U.S. 
and European products in Japan may reflect the marketing strategies of oligo- 
polistic firms. As Cline notes, U.S. and European firms appear to have con- 
cluded that they can maximize profits in  the Japanese market through low- 
volume, high-price sales. 
It is not at all surprising that, in  the absence of  trade barriers, U.S.  and 
European firms can successfully maintain price differentials in excess of trans- 
port costs. For example, if it is assumed that demand for many of these prod- 
ucts is relatively price inelastic, and if it is further assumed that there are fixed 
costs (perhaps because of economies of  scale in transportation) in  the arbi- 
trage of the kinds of differentiated final products examined in the Department 
of Commerce/MITI price survey, such price differentials are not at all implau- 
sible. 
The absence of  statistically significantly different prices in U.S.  and Japa- 
nese markets for Japanese products is largely consistent with Lawrence’s find- 
ing that both distribution margins and the cost of distribution as a proportion 
of  final goods prices are more or less the same in both Japan and the United 
States. It may not be consistent, however, with Lawrence’s findings on  the 
very high rates of return for capital invested and the very high share in value 
added of  profit for Japanese manufacturing. The relatively high profit rates 
compared to other major industrialized countries, which Lawrence cites, how- 
ever, may be a statistical mirage. Relative to all other major industrialized 
countries, save possibly Italy, Japan’s manufacturing sector includes dispro- 
portionate numbers of self-employed. The profit numbers Lawrence cites in- 
clude self-employment income as part of operating surplus and therefore over- 
states the Japanese (and the Italian) rates of return. Japanese profit rates are 
likely to be high relative to most other countries not because Japanese market 
power allegedly keeps prices high and goods out, but because the rates include 
a substantial chunk of labor income. 
The Japanese Adjustment Mechanism and the Structural 
Impediments Initiative 
While I may disagree with some of  the details of  Lawrence’s analysis, I 
certainly share his conclusion that there is little in the character of the Japa- 
nese market for manufactured goods that prevents marginal responses to price 
and cost incentives. The dramatic increase in  the total volume of  manufac- 
tured goods entering Japan during the past four years, largely in response to 
exchange rate changes, persuades Lawrence that there is little necessity for an 
entirely new  approach to trade relations with Japan. Lawrence intends his 
conclusion as a rejection of the “managed trade” approach advocated by many 
critics of Japan’s economic practices. Though he does not develop the theme, 
his conclusions are also an interesting commentary on the U.S.-Japan Struc- 
tural Impediments Initiative (SII) discussions. 
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market.  l5  This linkage  reflects long-standing  thinking  in the OECD and in 
some quarters of the U.S. Treasury (the U.S. government agency that took the 
initiative in the spring of  1989 in proposing the SII talks) that structural fac- 
tors in  many of the major industrialized  economies (but particularly Japan) 
prevent  the exchange rate mechanism from playing its traditional role in the 
international  adjustment process.  The SII is very  useful  in reassuring  both 
the American and Japanese electorate about the terms of foreign access to the 
Japanese  market. Lawrence’s work reminds us, however,  that the empirical 
underpinnings  of  the conventional  OECD and Treasury  analysis remain, at 
best, an open issue. 
Comment  MXCUS  Noland 
Robert Lawrence has written  a very  good paper.  Its strength  lies in  going 
beyond the now-sterile exercise of running regressions on cross-national data 
to determine if Japan imports enough, to analyzing the institutions and incen- 
tives that condition Japanese importing behavior. 
The argument of the beginning of the paper questioning the links between 
goals and measures is quite useful in delineating these issues. The most im- 
portant part of the paper is its exploration of the role of intrafirm trade and, 
more  specifically,  the trading  houses. Japan’s uniqueness lies in the impor- 
tance of domestic firms in importation, and given the degree of concentration 
in the Japanese economy (and the trading sector in particular),  there is the 
obvious potential for the exercise of market power by firms or the facilitation 
of administrative guidance by the government.  Thus the existing institutional 
framework provides both the incentives and the mechanisms for impeding the 
penetration of directly competing imports. 
Such behavior  has in fact been  described  by employees of  major trading 
companies and is consistent with the observation that Japan engages in little 
intra-industry trade. A note of caution may be warranted though. Lawrence’s 
interpretation of  intrafirm trade may or may not be consistent with evidence 
on Japan’s trade with the NICs presented in the Park and Park paper (in this 
volume).  Moreover, as Peter Petri observes in his paper (in this volume), Eu- 
ropean  manufactured exports to Japan  have  grown faster than those  of  the 
United  States, though  one would expect them to encounter similar types of 
market  impediments.  So  there  are  still  some  unanswered  questions here. 
Some attempts to estimate the rent transfers implied by the oligosonistic mar- 
ket structures would be desirable. These firms are not for the most part mon- 
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opsonists,  and what  is needed are some very micro-oriented  investigations 
into the sort of noncompetitive behavior Lawrence has intimated. 
A second implication of Lawrence’s analysis is that manufactured products 
will find their way  into Japan if  they are inputs for goods produced by the 
major firms. Again, this would be consistent with recent increases in manu- 
factured imports from the NICs, which have grown faster manufactured im- 
ports overall, although Park and Park appear to suggest that intrafirm trade has 
not been so important. One theme that Lawrence does not develop is the ex- 
tent to which  this restructuring has been actively supported by  government 
policy, especially foreign aid policy. This is especially important given the 
rapid growth in Japan’s develop assistance programs, which are concentrated 
on surrounding Asian countries. 
To  a great extent, current Japanese thinking on development assistance is 
driven by  visions of restructuring and a furthering of the vertical division of 
labor. Historically, one of the main priorities of economic policy has been the 
need to assure access to supplies of imported raw materials, much of which 
have come from surrounding Asian countries. In the 1960s and 1970s devel- 
opment assistance and the trading companies both played roles in this policy. 
Now, under the high yen, the Japan-as-processing-country analysis has been 
pushed one step further to Japan-as-high-value-added processor, which means 
that Japan must secure access to low-cost intermediate inputs. Policy still sup- 
ports Japan’s access to the required inputs, except now these are increasingly 
manufactures. Two examples may be made that illustrate the point. 
The first is a  1988 study by  the Economic Planning Agency. It explicitly 
calls for the coordination,  by  Tokyo, of the industrial policies of the Asian 
countries by  something called  “the Asian  brain.”  (If the geography is any 
guide, Korea would be the right hand. You can fill in the rest of the body parts 
yourselves.) The “Asian brain” would coordinate industrial  investment and 
the supporting industrial policies throughout the region, much as MITI did in 
the Japanese economy of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Farfetched as this sounds, this kind of thinking does inform Japanese devel- 
opment assistance.  An example is JAIDO (the Japan International Develop- 
ment  Corporation),  a recently formed organization to promote public- and 
private-sector joint development projects. To support Japanese strategic inter- 
ests, JAIDO has made the Philippines the focus of its efforts to date. There, 
JAIDO is supporting four projects: (1) the development of a copper refining 
industry (this is the old-style secure-access-to-raw-materials strategy); (2) the 
development of  an  industrial  park (this is the new-style facilitate-Japanese- 
FDI-and-secure-access to-low-cost manufactured-inputs  strategy); (3) a proj- 
ect to produce and export papayas to Japan (this one is quite interesting since 
it runs directly counter to agricultural protectionism. When I asked a JAIDO 
official about this he admitted that, yes, as yet they had been unable to export 
any of the papayas because of the quarantine, but they were still trying). The 
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Japanese, so that they can write Japanese language computer software, and 
thus help ease the software shortage in Japan. 
The point of this is that the Japanese market may be becoming more open 
to some manufactured imports, while remaining inhospitable to others. To use 
the distance metaphor, if you are producing inputs for major producers, Japan 
may be close, but if you are producing competing products (or even worse, 
products that the government has targeted for development) Japan may  be 
very far away. 
Finally, though I largely agree with Lawrence the economist, I am  much 
less comfortable with Lawrence the political analyst or trade negotiation strat- 
egist. Lawrence expresses surprise that increasing numbers of Americans are 
exasperated with the apparent lack of substantive progress in America’s long- 
running trade negotiations with Japan. I cannot help but believe that this is a 
tad  disingenuous (especially from someone who made Newsweek‘s  top  10 
Japan-bashers list, a distinction that no other participant in the conference that 
produced this volume can claim). 
Lawrence takes the position that all we need to do is increase the number of 
sectors under negotiation from four to 40, then wait for the imports to start 
rolling in. To  support his contention, Lawrence cites the examples of  ciga- 
rettes, and the four original MOSS-talk sectors, as success stories. By his own 
admission, it took nearly 10  years of pressure to get liberalization of the ciga- 
rette market, longer than it took to negotiate SALT I, SALT 11,  or the INF 
treaties with the Soviets. As for the MOSS talks, conducted at the undersec- 
retary level, there has been some progress, but at the cost of tremendous ex- 
penditures of human and material resources, as made clear by Amelia Porges 
(in this volume). Moreover, the U.S. Trade Representative’s 1989 report on 
the foreign trade barrier includes many of the sectors previously negotiated- 
including all four of the MOSS categories. In fact, the three Japanese prac- 
tices under Super 301 investigation are all issues left unresolved by the MOSS 
talks. 
The question is, have the narrow gains been worth the expenditures of real 
resources and political capital necessary to bring sufficient pressure to bear on 
Japan to enter into and abide by  market opening agreements? In the case of 
the United States, where the government is obligated under U.S.  trade law to 
investigate producer-initiated complaints, to ask the question is to answer it: 
the U.S. government will be  under considerable pressure to pursue further 
market-opening initiatives for the foreseeable future. The question then is, is 
a fundamentally new strategy needed? Lawrence says no, just do more of the 
same stuff. 
If one believes Lawrence’s analysis (which I generally do) that an important 
part of market access problems stem from noncompetitive markets, not Japa- 
nese government policy per se, there is a real policy problem. Probably the 
only thing that could really address the situation is a comprehensive, proactive 
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ment.  Unfortunately, I suspect that neither Lawrence nor  I can offer much 
advice on how to go about encouraging this. Perhaps the Structural Impedi- 
ments Initiative (SII) will encourage it; perhaps exchange-rate appreciation 
will  loosen up  the  system, as some of  Lawrence’s results suggest.  In  the 
meantime, my prognosis is for increasing prominence of “monitored trade”- 
careful surveillance of  practices and outcomes combined with  explicit and 
credible threats of  retaliation, as in the cases of  cellular telephones and the 
Schumer amendment on the government bond market. As Masahiro Okuno- 
Fujiwara (in this volume) indicates, industrial policy in Japan is an insider’s 
game-threats  of retaliation, complete with preannounced “hit lists” may be 
useful in mobilizing domestic insider support in the target country (Japan) to 
support liberalization in the face of  possible loss of  exports markets in the 
United States. 
But as Koichi Hamada has pointed out, there is a fine line between beating 
someone over the head with a stick to encourage liberalization, and beating 
them over the head with an aluminum baseball bat and provoking a trade war. 
The only thing I can say with much certainty is that the future looks good for 
trade lobbyists who will probably earn rates of  return higher than those who 
participated in this U.S. -Japan trade conference. This Page Intentionally Left Blank